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Abstract
Health information technologies facilitate the collection of massive quantities of patient-level data. A growing body of
research demonstrates that such information can support novel, large-scale biomedical investigations at a fraction of the
cost of traditional prospective studies. While healthcare organizations are being encouraged to share these data in a de-
identified form, there is hesitation over concerns that it will allow corresponding patients to be re-identified. Currently
proposed technologies to anonymize clinical data may make unrealistic assumptions with respect to the capabilities of a
recipient to ascertain a patients identity. We show that more pragmatic assumptions enable the design of anonymization
algorithms that permit the dissemination of detailed clinical profiles with provable guarantees of protection. We
demonstrate this strategy with a dataset of over one million medical records and show that 192 genotype-phenotype
associations can be discovered with fidelity equivalent to non-anonymized clinical data.
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Introduction
Routine clinical care generates detailed, longitudinal informa-
tion about a patient’s health, medications, allergies, and treatment
response. Recording and preserving these data, typically through
an electronic medical record (EMR), can enable greater efficiency
and effectiveness in the actions of care providers [1–3]. In the
hopes of realizing the full potential of health information
technology, the past several years has witnessed dramatic growth
in the quantity and quality of clinical data [4], which, in turn, has
become an invaluable resource for a wide range of secondary (i.e.,
not direct care) endeavors [5,6], including public health [7,8],
quality assessment [9], and medical research [10,11]. With regard
to the latter, EMRs are increasingly linked to biorepositories to
enable large cost-effective association studies between genomes
and an expanding range of phenotypes [12–15], such as
atrioventricular conduction [16], white [17] and red [18] blood
cell traits, hypothyroidism [19], and, more recently, the study of
pharmacogenetic traits, including clopidogrel-response [20] and
warfarin dose [21]. To facilitate transparency and enable reuse,
collections of genotypes and DNA sequences tied to clinical
knowledge are shared beyond the originating healthcare institu-
tions, such as through the Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes
(dbGaP) at the National Institutes of Health [22].
The majority of datasets currently shared via dbGaP, and
similar environments, enable validation of known findings [23],
but they lack the phenotypic detail necessary to support novel
scientific investigations, thus slowing or preventing innovative
biomedical research. A major obstacle to dissemination of
clinically-rich datasets is the concern that disclosure of detailed
records can cause privacy breaches, particularly in the form of
patient re-identification [24,25]. Indeed, a growing number of
studies illustrate how simple patient-specific data, such as
demographics [26–29], hospital visit patterns [30], or insurance
billing codes [31] – which correspond to International Classifica-
tion of Diseases - 9th Revision (ICD-9) and are a core element of
clinical phenotype specifications [13] – can be exploited for
identification purposes. An additional concern is the contention
that DNA sequence information is inherently identifiable [32],
although patient-specific sequence databases to create such
vulnerabilities are not (yet) generally available [33].
Concerns over re-identification can be mitigated through
pragmatic governance models that integrate ethical, legal, and
technical controls [34–37]. From a technical perspective, various
approaches for the anonymization of patient-specific data have
been proposed [38,39], but they are limited in their scope by
considering unrealistically strong attackers. Of particular impor-
tance for the dissemination of clinical data, Loukides et al.
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introduced an anonymization method for billing codes [40], but
assumed the recipient of the data knows that a specific patient is a
member of the cohort. While such a threat is plausible, it is not
always likely and, in many situations, it is prudent for healthcare
institutions to assume more realistic adversaries: for example, a
recipient may only know that an individual was a patient at the
hospital and not that they were a member of a specific research
cohort [41,42]. We hypothesize that using larger populations for
anonymization will yield more accurate biomedical knowledge
discovery.
To investigate this hypothesis, we developed methods to
anonymize datasets that contain a large amount of clinical data
that account for varying degrees of a recipient’s knowledge. To
assess our models, we conducted an evaluation with three datasets
derived from the EMR system of the Vanderbilt University
Medical Center (VUMC), covering over one million patient
records. Our findings illustrate that making more pragmatic
assumptions on the capabilities of the recipient enables the
dissemination of significantly greater quantities of patient-specific
data in comparison to prior approaches. We find this method
enables the dissemination of privacy-protected clinical data that
support the discovery of phenome-wide associations equal to those
previously published using non-protected information [43].
Results
We evaluated the influence of anonymization on two distinct
types of knowledge discovery criteria. First, we summarize the
quantity of clinical information retained in the anonymized
datasets in comparison to the original resource. This provides a
general sense of the quantity of clinical knowledge that can be
disseminated. Second, we conducted Phenome-wide Association
Studies (PheWAS) to characterize the extent to which phenotype-
genotype associations are retained. In this scenario, all of our
assessments are performed on the DEMO dataset.
Retention of General Clinical Information
Table 1 summarizes the quantity of clinical information
retained in the anonymized datasets. We represent the changes
through the use of two measures: Diagnosis Coverage (DC) and
Code Coverage (CC). Diagnosis Count is a general measure of
how many unique diagnoses are contained in the anonymized
data, while Code Count is a measure of how many unique ICD-9
codes appear in the anonymized data. First, we examine the
changes to the datasets resulting from anonymization process. It
can be seen that SD-Anon yields the best retention of clinical
information (99.99% DC and 99.98% CC) and BioVU-Anon has a
slightly higher DC than DEMOD (99.99% and 99.57%,
respectively). However, DEMOD has a higher CC than BioVU-
Anon (80.78% and 77.02%, respectively). It is worth noting that
this finding is influenced by the difference in CC and DC in the
initial subsets (i.e., DEMO and BioVU). If the counts are considered
in relation to the original SD, then BioVU-Anon has a DC of
19.71% and a CC of 67.65%, while DEMOD has a DC of 2.02%
and a CC of 46.80%, showing that BioVU-Anon retains more
information than DEMOD overall.
Next, we compare the information retained in the three
Demonstration groups. Again, we see that DEMOS , the SD
anonymization, performs better than either of the other anon-
ymizations (99.99% DC and 99.93% CC). Additionally, we find
that DEMOD performs better than DEMOB in DC (99.57% and
91.50%, respectively), whereas the reverse is true for CC (80.78%
and 96.84%, respectively).
In combination, these findings partially confirm our earlier
hypothesis. DEMOS , which is derived from the largest population,
results in the best retention of general clinical information among
the DEMO anonymizations. However, neither DEMOB nor
DEMOD clearly outperforms the other, which we discuss below.
In Tables 2 and 3, we show the full results we measured
following the anonymization. In Table 2, we report the expanded
DC information. In the left part of the chart, we report our
findings without generalization - that is, if codes which occur in
fewer than k records are removed from the set, rather than
aggregated. For this, we report three measures. First, the count of
diagnoses in the data set. Second, the as a percentage of the count
to the total number of diagnoses in the SD (SD%). This measure
allows us to determine how much information this anonymization
retains of the entire population data set. Finally, we report the
ratio of the count to the total number of diagnoses in its similar,
non-anonymized data set. For example, for BioVU-Anon, the Local
% measure compares to BioVU. As we hypothesized, we see in that
even without generalization, SD-Anon still represents the highest
retention of data of the SD (99.97%). We further see that BioVU-
Anon and DEMOD each have lower percentages of the SD, as is
expected. However, we also see that they each contain less
Table 1. Summary statistics and information retention for the
datasets in this study.
Original Dataset
Anonymized
Version Code Count Diagnosis Count
Population
Size
Synthetic
Derivative(SD)* 15,115 – 13,432,263 – 1,366,786
SD-Anon 15,112 99.98% 13,431,347 99.99% 1,366,552
BioVU* 13,275 – 2,647,056 – 104,904
BioVU-Anon 10,225 (77.02%) 2,646,872 (99.99%) 104,790
Demonstration
Group (DEMO)* 8,734 – 272,080 – 5,994
DEMOs 8,747 (99.93%) 272,043 (99.99%) 5,994
DEMOB 8,476 (99.93%) 248,925 (91.50%) 5,595
DEMOD 7,071 (80.78%) 270,867 (99.57%) 5,971
Code Count and Diagnosis Count are the number of unique ICD-9 (or
generalized set of ICD-9 codes) and total number of diagnoses for all records in
the anonymized dataset, respectively. In this table, *corresponds to the original
(i.e., non-anonymized) datasets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.t001
Table 2. Full Diagnosis Count information retained.
Dataset Diagnosis Count Diagnosis Count
without Generalization with Generalization
Count SD % Local % Count SD % Local %
SD-Anon 13428542 99.97% 99.97% 13431347 99.99% 99.99%
BioVU-Anon 2639298 19.65% 99.71% 2643872 19.68% 99.88%
DEMOD 269868 2.01% 99.20% 270867 2.02% 99.57%
DEMOs 271970 2.02% 99.97% 272043 2.03% 99.99%
DEMOB 248467 1.85% 91.33% 248925 1.85% 91.50%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.t002
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information with respect to their original dataset as well (99.71%
and 99.20%, respectively).
If we turn our attention to a comparison of the three
Demonstration datasets, we see that DEMOS is still, as expected,
the best performing. We note that our earlier observation about
the divergence from our expectation degrading DEMOD and
DEMOB still holds true here.
Next, in Table 3, we show the extended CC information
retained. Similarly to Table 3, we report the original count and use
the same additional measures to determine the information
retention.
Here, we note several interesting findings. First, while the DC
without and with generalization (99.97%, 99.99%) were similar,
this is not the case with CC. Without generalization, SD-Anon
retains only 89.48% of codes, while with generalization this
retention is 99.98%. Considering these two statistics together, we
see that by generalizing, we are able to release information about
10.5% of codes - approximately 1,500 codes – that, while
generalized in the release, would be completely absent from the
data were we to simply suppress them. We see similar, though less
dramatic, results from the other two data sets.
If we again turn our attention to a comparison of the three
DEMO sets, we see that, again, DEMOS clearly has more
information retention than the other two DEMO sets. Most
strikingly, DEMOS , using the Local % measure, retains almost
30% more codes in the anonymized set (approximately 4,500
codes) over DEMOD even without generalization. If we also
consider generalized codes, DEMOS keeps approximately 19%
more codes over DEMOD.
Again, we note that the difference in retention between
DEMOD and DEMOB that was visible in the DC measure does
not appear in the Code Count measure. Instead, we see that, as
hypothesized, the larger the original set of data that is
anonymized, the more information we retain in the anonymized
data set (as measured by number of codes available for evaluation).
Even though DEMOB performs better using this measure, the
clearly superior data set is DEMOS .
Retention of Genotype-Phenotype Associations
A Phenome-Wide Association Study (PheWAS) [19,44,45]
assesses which clinical phenotypes from across a collection of
concepts (in this case, a set of related billing codes grouped
according to semantic similarity) are associated with a specific
genomic region of interest. Patients are marked as either cases or
controls according to the presence and absence of certain billing
codes. In its simplest form the analysis determines the genotype
distributions and calculates a x2 statistic, with an associated p-
value and an odds-ratio. Conditions with pƒ0:05 corrected for
multiple comparisons are considered significant. We note that the
point of the analysis in this paper is to determine the level of
information loss resulting from anonymization of this dataset;
specifically, we acknowledge that each of the conditions labeled as
significant here only indicate a potential significance in a PheWAS
discovery analysis, and are not necessarily conclusive. To conduct
the present analysis, we focus on the anonymized demonstration
cohorts and the six single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)
analyzed in the original PheWAS study of Denny et al. [43].
Table 4 compares the associations discovered in the anonymized
and original datasets.
We first look at Type I errors, which we refer to as lost
associations. These correspond to conditions determined to be
significant in the original PheWAS study on DEMO, but were
found to have pw0:05 in an anonymized dataset. It can be seen
that only DEMOS yields no lost associations across all SNPs. By
contrast, DEMOD has only a single SNP (rs1333049) where there
were no lost associations. Every other SNP has at least one lost
association. DEMOB sustained lost associations in each SNP.
Notably, DEMOB sustained a larger number of lost associations
than DEMOD for every SNP.
Next, we turn our attention to Type II errors, which we refer to
as false associations. These correspond to conditions with pw0:05
in the original study, but pƒ0:05 in the anonymized dataset. It
can be observed that DEMOS is the only anonymization which in
all cases has no additional significant associations reported.
Similarly, DEMOD has one SNP (rs6457620) which has no new
associations, though this is not the same SNP that sustained no lost
associations. Again, DEMOB yielded new associations for each
SNP.
PheWAS Case Studies
Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6
illustrate how p-values change for the phenotype associations
across all SNPs in the form of QQ-plots. A perfect similarity would
be represented by the line y~x, such that points along this line
indicate the value in the original and anonymized analysis are
equivalent. By contrast, points that deviate from this line indicate a
change in the p value, such that the distance to the line indicates
the magnitude of change. It can be seen that the DEMOS results
lie consistently along the basis line, indicating that the values
calculated in the original and anonymized PheWAS were
approximately equivalent. For DEMOB and DEMOD, however,
there are more differences in the p-values between those derived
from the original and anonymized datasets. Below, we highlight
some specific changes in each PheWAS study conducted.
The plots in Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11,
and Figure 12 depict the change in {log10(p)-values. It can be
seen that DEMOB resulted in value changes of various
frequencies, but that the DEMOS remained consistent across
the association studies, with nearly 700 conditions (i.e., ICD-9
groupings) retaining their original p-value. We can also see that
DEMOD, while having fewer and smaller changes, those changes
were significant enough to alter the effects of the significant
conditions.
rs1333049. Figure 1 indicates there were at least three
associations expected between approximately 0.5 and 1. Yet, in
the anonymized dataset, the p-values for these associations were all
close to 0, indicating a high likelihood of association. An example
of a condition in this affected region is 440.00 atherosclerosis. There
were also lost associations, such as condition 486 pneumonia,
unspecified organism which, in the original PheWAS, was
considered a significant association, but DEMOB has a changed
p-value such that the condition is now non-significant.
Table 3. Full Code Count information retained.
Dataset Code Count Code Count
without Generalization with Generalization
Count SD % Local % Count SD % Local %
SD-Anon 13525 89.48% 89.48% 15112 99.98% 99.98%
BioVU-Anon 9785 64.74% 73.71% 10225 67.65% 77.02%
DEMOD 6952 45.99% 79.42% 7071 46.78% 80.78%
DEMOS 8681 57.43% 99.18% 8747 57.87% 99.93%
DEMOB 8179 54.11% 93.44% 8476 56.08% 96.84%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.t003
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rs2200733. Figure 3 indicates there was an association which
was anticipated to have a p-value of approximately 1.6. Yet, in the
anonymized dataset, the p-value for this association was close to 4,
indicating a high likelihood of association.
rs2476601. Figure 2 indicates there was an association which
was anticipated to have a p-value of approximately 0.5. Yet, in the
anonymized dataset, the p-value for condition 762 was close to 2,
indicating a high likelihood of association.
rs3135388. Figure 4 indicates that condition 134 would
originally have a lower likelihood of association. However, the
anonymization, its p-value has sufficiently changed for it to be
considered significant. Similarly, in DEMOB, condition 223
originally had a value of approximately 1.6. In the anonymization,
however, this value decreased to approximately 0.3, making it far
less likely to be labeled significant.
rs6457620. Figure 5 indicates an expected value of at least
0.75 for a number of conditions, including 761, 976, 828, and 127,
that, when anonymized, appear to be at or near 0.
rs17234657. Figure 6 indicates an expected value of at least
1.5 for two conditions, 976 (1.5) and 140 (3.6), when anonymized,
appear to be at or near 0, completely removing them from
significance.
Summary of Findings
In terms of general information retention, DEMOS always
outperformed DEMOD and DEMOB. This result suggests that
the larger the initial set from which the subset is drawn, the more
likely it is that deidentification can retain associations that are
being sought. In terms of PheWAS, DEMOS exactly matched the
evaluation performed on DEMO the non-anonymized Demon-
stration cohort. We have also shown that, when compared to the
Table 4. Results of anonymization on PheWAS Analysis for six SNPs.
SNP Phenotype Associations at pƒ0:05 in PheWAS
Original number of
associations Lost Associations False Associations
(Type I Error) (Type II Error)
DEMOD DEMOB DEMOS DEMOD DEMOB DEMOS
rs1333049 30 0 9 0 1 13 0
rs2200733 27 2 8 0 1 7 0
rs2476601 33 1 4 0 4 6 0
rs3135388 39 4 12 0 2 9 0
rs6457620 35 3 7 0 0 12 0
rs17234657 28 3 9 0 1 6 0
Total 192 13 49 0 9 53 0
DEMOD , DEMOB , and DEMOS are the Demonstration group when anonymized, extracted from the BioVU anonymization, and extracted from the SD anonymization,
respectively. Original is the number of significant associations (p 0.05) found in the PheWAS when conducted on pre-anonymized data. Identical is the number of
associations which were the same between studies. Lost is the number of associations that were lost in the anonymized study. False is the number of associations that
were determined as significant in the new study but were not in the original.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.t004
Figure 1. Changes in p-values for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs1333049 presented as a QQ-plot for left)
DEMOD, middle) DEMOB, and right) DEMOS. Descriptions of the annotated conditions in the plots are provided in Table 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g001
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total amount of information in the original data (i.e., the SD),
DEMOB outperforms DEMOD, but that when anonymized data
is compared to its non-anonymized data, the opposite is true in
some of our measures. Additionally, DEMOB has a much greater
number of lost and false associations than DEMOD (or DEMOS ).
The relationship between DEMOB and DEMOD is not quite as
paradoxical as it may appear. In BioVU, when generalizing codes,
some records have repeated incidents of related, low-frequency
conditions. For example, consider record 49532 in Figure 13a.
Notice that in one visit, both codes 401.00– malignant hypertension -
and 401.01– benign hypertension - are present. However, in
Figure 13b, the codes have been replaced with S401:00,401:01T
(read as: ‘‘400.00 and/or 400.01’’). Considering just these codes,
the DC in the original dataset equals two. However, once these
codes are transformed into S400:00,400:01T, the result is a single
generalized code, which halves the number of diagnoses in the
anonymized dataset, yielding a DC of one. While the expectation
was that BioVU would yield better results due to its significant
increase in size, DEMOs population was selected to satisfy several
specific phenotypes. As a result, records in DEMO were much
more similar than records within BioVU. Consequently, less
generalization was necessary to obtain DEMOD than DEMOB.
This does not indicate that the anonymization strategy is
ineffective. Instead, we have shown that it is important for the data
holder to anticipate how the post-anonymization data will be used.
If the data is intended to assist in hypothesis validation for a very
specific cohort, then use of DEMOD may be sufficient. If,
however, the data is intended to support hypothesis generation,
then the use of DEMOB may be preferable. Regardless of the end
use, however, DEMOS provides the most benefit to either task. As
an additional merit to the use of DEMOS , any further cohort that
is drawn from SD-Anon is subject to the same protection, which
Figure 2. Changes in p-values for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs2476601 presented as a QQ-plot for left)
DEMOD, middle) DEMOB, and right) DEMOS. Descriptions of the annotated conditions in the plots are provided in Table 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g002
Figure 3. Changes in p-values for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs2200733 presented as a QQ-plot for left)
DEMOD, middle) DEMOB, and right) DEMOS. Descriptions of the annotated conditions in the plots are provided in Table 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g003
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means that if a user is grouped into two different cohorts, the exact
same information will be revealed about this user to both groups.
Separate anonymizations for data selections may not hold this
property. Further research is necessary to determine what privacy
claims, if any, may hold over repeated anonymizations of separate
cohorts.
Discussion
The anonymization method proposed in this paper is a
significant improvement over prior approaches. It enables
healthcare institutions to account for adversaries of varying
strengths. Moreover, our analysis illustrates that when an
adversary is aware that a patient was a member of the hospitals
general population (as opposed to as a specific cohort), the utility of
the anonymized cohort is virtually equivalent to the pre-
anonymized results. These results suggest that when reasonable
adversarial models are applied in the context of large medical
facilities, phenome-wide annotation of clinical populations could
be anonymized, allowing public sharing of such data, without
sacrificing research findings. Adoption of such a principled
approach could enable much greater utility of extant research
data sets such as currently stored within dbGaP.
This finding indicates that rather than selecting the smallest
possible subset of data that may need to be released, there is
significant value in anonymizing the entire body of data at an
institution. Release of even subsets of these data provide far more
data to subsequent researchers, while still maintaining a high
standard of privacy for the patients reflected in these data. This
implies that institutions may be able to publicly release large, dense
datasets for various research purposes with provable privacy
guarantees.
Figure 4. Changes in p-values for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs3135388 presented as a QQ-plot for left)
DEMOD, middle) DEMOB, and right) DEMOS. Descriptions of the annotated conditions in the plots are provided in Table 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g004
Figure 5. Changes in p-values for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs6457620 presented as a QQ-plot for left)
DEMOD, middle) DEMOB, and right) DEMOS. Descriptions of the annotated conditions in the plots are provided in Table 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g005
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Our study does include limitations, which can serve as
guidelines for future research. First, from a technical perspective,
the clinical code generalization strategy employed by the
anonymization algorithm does not guarantee minimizing the
amount of information loss incurred by the anonymization. For
example, our algorithm chooses only one potential generalization
from among many options. We chose this method of generaliza-
tion because it is known to be computationally intractable for such
Figure 6. Changes in p-values for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs17234657 presented as a QQ-plot for left)
DEMOD, middle) DEMOB, and right) DEMOS. Descriptions of the annotated conditions in the plots are provided in Table 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g006
Table 5. Descriptions for the condition codes presented in the QQ-plots.
Code Condition
127 Other intestinal helminthiases
134 Other infestation
140 Malignant neoplasm of lip
223 Benign neoplasm of kidney and other urinary organs
242 Thyrotoxicosis with or without goiter
264 Vitamin A deficiency
307.1 Eating disorders
392 Rheumatic chorea
411 Ischemic heart disease
458 Hypotension
558 Other and unspecified noninfectious gastroenteritis and colitis
676 Other disorders of the breast associated with childbirth and disorders of lactation
714 Rheumatoid arthritis and other inflammatory polyarthropathies
738 Other acquired musculoskeletal deformity
743 Congenital anomalies of eye
761 Fetus or newborn affected by maternal complications of pregnancy
762 Fetus or newborn affected by complications of placenta, cord, and membranes
764 Slow fetal growth and fetal malnutrition
771 Infections specific to the perinatal period
777 Perinatal disorders of digestive system
778 Conditions involving the integument and temperature regulation of fetus and newborn
779 Other and ill-defined conditions originating in the perinatal period
828 Multiple fractures involving both lower limbs, lower with upper limb, and lower limb(s) with rib(s) and sternum
976 Poisoning by agents primarily affecting skin and mucous membrane, ophthalmological, otorhinolaryngological, and dental drugs
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.t005
Association Discovery w/o Sacrificing Anonymity
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data to be produced in a manner that minimizes information loss
[46,47]. Nonetheless, we suspect that additional heuristics may be
devised which can provide improvements or alternatives to our
results.
Second, from an implementation perspective, it is important to
note that certain healthcare institutions may be more likely to be
attacked than others. As a consequence, we recommend that a
healthcare institution assess the anticipated capabilities of their
data recipients before adopting an anonymization strategy such as
the one presented in this manuscript. For instance, healthcare
institutions may choose a weaker adversarial model if they
anticipate that the data recipient is a credentialed scientific
investigator as opposed to an unknown individual in the general
public [33]. Similarly, healthcare institutions manage vastly
different volumes of data. While we have shown here that the
utility and privacy impact on data of this magnitude are beneficial,
further work is needed to determine what volume of data is
necessary to obtain similar findings.
Methods
Study Overview
A summary of the datasets analyzed in this study are reported in
Table 1, while their relationships are visually depicted in Figure 14.
The first dataset corresponds to a HIPAA de-identified (see
Methods) version of all VUMC patient records, called the
Synthetic Derivative (SD) [48], which contains 1,366,786 records.
The second dataset corresponds to a subset of this resource for
which the VUMC collected de-identified DNA samples, called
BioVU (n=104,904). The third dataset, referred to as DEMO
(n=5,944), is a subset of BioVU records that were previously
analyzed to demonstrate the feasibility of phenome-wide associ-
ation studies (PheWAS), using specific genotypes, via information
Figure 7. Distribution of p-value changes for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs1333049 for left) DEMOD, middle)
DEMOB, and right) DEMOS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g007
Figure 8. Distribution of p-value changes for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs1333049 for left) DEMOD, middle)
DEMOB, and right) DEMOS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g008
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in existing EMRs [43]. In this dataset, each patient record is
divided into a series of visits made to VUMC-affiliated healthcare
providers. Each visit is characterized by the clinical activities that
transpired, including diagnoses made, medications prescribed, and
laboratory test results. An example of the structure of such records
is depicted in Figure 13a. For this study, we anonymize the ICD-9
billing codes in the records, but we remark that our method is
sufficiently general to apply to any standardized vocabulary of
clinical events.
To model how cohorts are disseminated for validation and
reuse, we developed a novel anonymization strategy that enables a
subset of the SD to be shared for research purposes. In short, this
strategy yields a patient record composed of diagnoses across all
their visits. The information is anonymized, such that for any set of
disclosed ICD-9 codes obtained at any one visit, there are at least k
records in the anonymized resource with this combination of codes
across all visits. For illustration, Figure 13b depicts a fictional
example of anonymized records, with k set to 2. In our evaluation,
we set k to 5, which is a level of protection commonly applied in
practice [41].
There are several ways in which data can be anonymized to
account for the knowledge of the recipient. Figure 14 depicts the
various strategies. We begin with all data contained within the SD,
from which we select two subsets. The first subset is BioVU and
the second is DEMO. Each of the three datasets is then
anonymized to create SD-Anon, BioVU-Anon, and DEMOD,
respectively. To examine the effect that each of the anonymiza-
tions have on subsequent analysis, we then extract the records
which are in DEMO from SD-Anon and BioVU-Anon, creating
DEMOS and DEMOB, respectively. Note, DEMOS , DEMOB,
and DEMOD each contain the same records, but the specific
Figure 9. Distribution of p-value changes for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs2476601 for left) DEMOD, middle)
DEMOB, and right) DEMOS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g009
Figure 10. Distribution of p-value changes for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs3135388 for left) DEMOD,
middle) DEMOB, and right) DEMOS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g010
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clinical codes within those records are different due to the
anonymization process.
Privacy Models and Methods
There are a variety of computational models that have been
proposed for protecting biomedical data. Most recently, random-
ization strategies, notably those based on differential privacy
[49,50], have been suggested. These approaches perturb records
through a controlled, but random, process (e.g., addition of codes
not originally diagnosed). Such a framework provides strong
proofs of privacy, but may be insufficient to support new studies at
varying levels of granularity. Moreover, if care is not taken in its
design, this strategy could lead to strange data representations
(e.g., juvenile patients diagnosed with Alzheimers disease), and in
the co-occurrence with a chance rare genetic event (e.g., a rare
functional mutation in an exon), could lead to an erroneous
association. Thus, we focused on data protection models that
remain true to the underlying data. To do so, we adopted a
variation of the k-anonymization principle [51], which states that
any combination of potential identifiers in the resultant dataset
must match at least k records. This principle has been applied to
various types of patient-level data, such as demographics [41], as
well as clinical codes [40]. To achieve privacy in our setting, we
enforced a constraint which states that, for each visit of a patient,
there are at least k patients who have the same set of diagnosis
codes from some visit in the resulting dataset. This model allows us
to represent an adversary with a moderate, but manageable, level
of knowledge regarding patient information released by the
institution.
Figure 11. Distribution of p-value changes for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs6457620 for left) DEMOD,
middle) DEMOB, and right) DEMOS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g011
Figure 12. Distribution of p-value changes for associations between clinical conditions and SNP rs17234657 for left) DEMOD,
middle) DEMOB, and right) DEMOS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g012
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Health Data De-identification According to Federal
Regulation and Residual Risks
Our goal is to enable biomedical analysis with patient-level
records while thwarting re-identification attempts. Returning to
Figure 13, the SD is de-identified according to the Privacy Rule of
the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA). This was accomplished by removing eighteen specific
features of the data, including direct identifiers (e.g., patient names
and residential address), quasi-identifiers (e.g., dates of birth,
death, and healthcare provider visits), and specific identification
numbers or codes (e.g., medical device identification numbers).
Despite the removal of such information, many records may be
uniquely distinguishable based on the combination of their
diagnosis codes. [31] For instance, imagine that an attacker knows
a patient, say ‘‘Alice’’ (49532), was assigned billing codes 427.31
atrial fibrillation and 401.00 hypertension in a hospital visit. Then,
according to the depiction to the left of Figure 13, Alice will be
uniquely identified in the original dataset. This means that the
attacker learns Alice was additionally diagnosed with code 695.40
systemic lupus (as well as any other codes or DNA sequences in the
released dataset). However, in the anonymized version of the table
to right of Figure 13, an attacker would be unable to determine
whether this patient is Record 1 or Record 4.
Clinical Concept Anonymization Process
To satisfy anonymization requirements, we invoke a system of
code generalization. The generalization replaces a specific ICD-9
code with a group of codes which are semantically similar. For
example, to successfully anonymize a dataset, we may need to
generalize the code 810.01 closed fracture of sternal end of clavicle to the
code ‘‘810.00 and/or 810.01’’ closed fracture of clavicle, sternal and/or
unspecified. However, this generalization introduces the need for
guidelines on what codes may acceptably be generalized together,
which are called utility constraints. For instance, generalizing
Figure 13. A fictional example of patient-specific records of diagnosis codes in the a) original resource and b) corresponding 2-
anonymized result. The braces (‘‘{ ldots }’’) demarcate the set of diagnoses received in a visit to a healthcare provider, while the brackets (‘‘S . . . T’’)
denote codes that have been generalized in accordance with the anonymization discussed herein.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g013
Figure 14. Datasets used for comparison of anonymization strategies. The DATA SELECT process is an extraction of some records of the SD
into a smaller, specific dataset, such as BioVU or a demonstration cohort. The ANONYMIZE process is the anonymization algorithm described in this
manuscript. The DEMO EXTRACT process selects the remaining records associated with the Demonstration cohort from a larger, anonymized dataset.
The resultant datasets are as follows: anonymized version of the Synthetic Derivative (SD-Anon); anonymized version of BioVU (BioVU-Anon); SD-
Anon, from which the demonstration group is extracted (DEMOS); BioVU-Anon, from which the demonstration group is extracted (DEMOB); and
the anonymized version of the demonstration cohort (DEMOD). DEMOS , DEMOB, and DEMOD each represent different anonymizations of the
Demonstration group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053875.g014
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810.01 to ‘‘940 and/or 810.01’’ burns or closed sternal fracture of the
clavicle would have introduced an entirely new condition ‘‘burns’’
instead of simply obscuring the specific region of the clavicle which
had been broken. To prevent such occurrences, we use a hierarchy
that defines what generalizations are allowed. For this work, we
use the hierarchy described in [43], which is a complete mapping
of all ICD-9 codes developed for clinical phenotype-genotype
association studies.
For the anonymization, our approach generalizes ICD-9 codes
with frequency (i.e., the number of records that contain the code in
one or more visits) below a threshold k within the dataset together.
First, we place each code in a bin corresponding to its frequency.
For instance, all codes assigned to only one patient are stored in
the first bin. For each bin with value less than k, the process
generalizes the codes within that bin as permitted by the utility
constraints. Next, the support is calculated for the new,
generalized code, which is moved into the appropriate bin. On
each subsequent iteration, we group adjacent bins together (i.e.,
bins one and two are grouped together, bins three and four are
grouped together) until all bins representing frequency less than k
have been grouped together. Note that by merging adjacent bins
(such as one and two), the result does not necessarily get moved
into bin three. Instead, the frequency is recalculated for all patients
who would have the new, generalized code. After this point, any
codes remaining with frequency less than k are suppressed.
At this point, the dataset satisfies the k-anonymization require-
ment and can be shared. However, assuming that the institution
holding the data does not wish to release the entire anonymized
dataset, this is the point at which subsets may be drawn from the
data. For example, suppose that external researchers were
interested in patients who had ischemic heart disease. Records
of specific interest could be extracted from the anonymized data
and then released to these researchers.
Computation of Diagnosis Count and Code Count
In Figure 15, we show an example computation of Diagnosis
Count (DC) and Code Count (CC). In the left part of the figure,
we show a non-anonymized example data set containing six
conditions, 053.11, 290.11, 427.31, 401.0, 695.4, and 810.03, and
four records - A, B, C, and D. We represent the datum that
Record B was diagnosed with condition 053.11 in some visit as a
‘‘Y’’ (also shown as a green cell highlight). The absence of this
diagnosis is represented as an ‘‘N’’ (also shown as a grey cell
highlight), as shown in the cell represented by condition 053.11
and Record A.
As shown, Diagnosis Count is simply the number of times that a
particular diagnosis is assigned across all patients in the set. Since
Record B is the only one that contains the diagnosis 053.11, its
Diagnosis Count is 1. Alternatively, Code Count is a count of the
number of codes that have positive diagnoses in that data set. As
shown in Figure 15, code 290.11 has no records with that
diagnosis. As such, its Code Count is 0. Since each other code has
at least one record with a positive diagnosis, each other count is 1,
giving the data set a Code Count of 5.
On the right side of Figure 15, we show a possible change in our
measures following anonymization. In this instance, the anonymi-
zation has suppressed Record 2’s diagnosis of 053.11 (now
represented as ‘‘N’’ in a red cell highlight). Because this decreased
the number of diagnoses in the data set, the Diagnosis Count
decreased by 1. However, since this was also the only diagnosis of
condition 053.11, that code is no longer represented in the data;
thus, the Code Count also decreased by 1.
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